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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO TEACHING WORK LAW

MARION CRAIN* AND PAULINE T. KIM**
INTRODUCTION
This essay discusses the holistic philosophy that guides us in thinking
about and teaching Work Law.1 As Michael Fischl has explained, most law
school curricula divide the law of the workplace into three discrete topics:
labor law, employment discrimination, and employment law—the “holy
trinity” of American work law.2 Labor Law traditionally encompasses the
study of collective rights at work, particularly the law governing union
organizing and collective bargaining.3 Employment Discrimination deals with
the statutes and case law that advance the antidiscrimination norm in the
workplace through prohibitions on status discrimination at work.4 Employment
Law covers the statutes and common law governing individual rights at work,
ranging from minimum standards legislation to judicially created doctrines
based in tort and contract law.5

* Marion Crain is Vice Provost at Washington University in St. Louis, the Wiley B. Rutledge
Professor of Law and Director of the Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Work & Social
Capital at Washington University School of Law in St. Louis.
** Pauline T. Kim is the Charles Nagel Professor of Law at Washington University School of
Law in St. Louis. We are grateful to Matthew Hoffman and Laura Raden for research assistance,
and to the Wefel Center for Employment Law at St. Louis University School of Law for
organizing this Symposium.
1. This philosophy is further elaborated in a textbook we co-authored with our colleague,
Michael Selmi. See MARION G. CRAIN, PAULINE T. KIM & MICHAEL SELMI, WORK LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS ix–x (2d ed. 2010).
2. Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28
BERK. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 165, 169–170 (2007).
3. Labor Law courses typically focus on the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
151–169 (2011).
4. Employment Discrimination courses are organized around the core antidiscrimination
statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006), but also
usually include coverage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213 (2006), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2008), and sometimes the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–
2654 (2006).
5. Employment Law courses tend to be survey courses, with coverage including the
common law of wrongful discharge; contract law pertaining to the employment relation,
including employee handbooks, covenants not to compete, and the law governing pre-dispute
7
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It has become increasingly clear, however, that regulation of the
employment relation defies such categorical thinking. Single actions by an
employer can easily yield multiple claims by workers that cross traditional
legal categories.6 The traditional division also misses important opportunities
to appreciate how the historical and social context shapes the form that labor
market intervention takes. A holistic approach offers the opportunity to forge a
comprehensive and coherent understanding of work law that will better prepare
students for the realities of practice, where factual issues know no doctrinal
boundaries.
Accordingly, we view regulation of the employment relation through a
broad lens, organizing study in a basic introductory survey course around core
themes of conflict that characterize the employment relation. We include job
security, employee mobility, dignitary interests, voice, equality and nondiscrimination, wages and hours, health and pension benefits, workplace
safety, and public and private systems of justice. In each area, we ask students
to consider how law should mediate the conflicts, what difference it makes
whether employee rights are conceptualized collectively or individually, what
influence the increasing racial, ethnic, and gender diversity of the workforce
should have on law and workplace policy, whether dispute resolution systems
should be privatized or remain in the public fora, and whether law is better
suited than human resource practices, employer initiatives, or employee selfhelp measures to accomplish the desired goals.7
In this Essay, we offer two examples of how such holistic coverage might
impact teaching and shape pedagogical goals.8 The first example illustrates
how legal problem-solving involving a concrete issue necessarily crosses
doctrinal boundaries. More specifically, we consider the challenges
surrounding the use of social media by employees, and the efforts of employers

arbitration agreements; tort claims for infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy;
statutory coverage of wage and hour laws, workplace safety, the provision of health care and
pension benefits, and family leave; and other topics of interest to the professor that can be
shoehorned into an already crowded semester.
6. Nicole Porter makes a similar point in her contribution to this Symposium. See Nicole
Buonocore Porter, A Proposal to Improve the Workplace Law Curriculum from a Corporate
Compliance Perspective, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 155 (2013). While she emphasizes teaching
workplace law from a corporate compliance perspective, our focus is on how to transcend these
doctrinal categories and present work law holistically to students from their first encounters with
the subject. This goal is particularly important given that a significant number of schools no
longer offer a separate labor law course. As Porter reports, 46 out of 195 law schools do not
currently offer labor law. See id. at 158.
7. CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 1, at x.
8. We focus on these two examples because they involve very recent developments in work
law, demonstrating the growing importance of approaching work law holistically. For additional
examples of workplace issues that cross doctrinal boundaries, see Porter, supra note 6, at 162–
169.
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to regulate that use. The emerging tension over who controls employees’
communications over social media implicates not only concerns about
individual speech and privacy rights, traditionally part of employment law, but
also the interests of employees in workplaces free of discrimination as well as
their interest in responding collectively to shared concerns about working
conditions, issues falling with the domains of employment discrimination and
labor law, respectively. Thus, when considering the interaction between social
media and the work relationship, a full appreciation of the legal risks and
strategies facing employers, employees and their representatives requires
facility with concepts across doctrinal categories. A holistic approach to
teaching employment law not only enables students to cross these boundaries,
it also enriches student understanding by highlighting the tensions as well as
commonalities between these seemingly disparate areas of the law.
The second example involves a more general theme running throughout
the law of work, the ability of employees to join together to leverage group
power vis-à-vis their employer. Because most individual employees are
relatively powerless against the consolidated power of the corporate employer,
all three traditional work law subjects must address how, if at all, law should
mediate that power imbalance. To what degree should law support the
conceptualization of rights and facilitate the assertion of claims at a collective
rather than individual level? In employment law, where the individual rights
conception is most pronounced, the individual was historically left to rely on
her own bargaining power. Congress soon found it necessary to establish
minimum standards regarding matters such as wages, hours, and safety
standards to prevent employers from exploiting individual vulnerability. In
recent years, debate has centered around the availability of class claims under
minimum standards legislation and in arbitration settings—are group claims
essential to effectively enforce those rights? In employment discrimination,
courts conceptualized discrimination as a harm that occurs to individuals
because of their membership in a group, which may be sufficient to support
class litigation in appropriate cases. The shifting nature of employment
discrimination and evolving Supreme Court doctrine renders class
discrimination claims increasingly difficult to maintain, however. In labor law,
Congress responded to the imbalance of power by protecting unionization and
mandating collective bargaining, explicitly permitting employees to band
together to leverage their labor power. When we put the class and collective
action claims from employment discrimination and employment law together
with the labor law perspective, we can begin to see them all as a piece of the
same conflict—a struggle over workers’ ability to leverage group power rather
than being forced to confront the employer as individuals.
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I. INDIVIDUAL VERSUS COLLECTIVE INTERESTS: THE CASE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
The explosive growth in popularity of social media platforms, like
Facebook and Twitter, has transformed how people communicate with one
another, and this transformation has inevitably affected workplace relations as
well. Some firms, particularly those with a broad consumer base, have sought
to harness the power of social media to promote their products and services
and manage their public images. At the same time, widespread private use of
social media by individuals has heightened firms’ interests in monitoring and
controlling the communications of their employees. For their part, employees
have an interest in unfettered use of these new platforms, as a means of
communication, entertainment, affiliation, and self-definition. The difficulties
in mediating this tension between employer and employee interests are
exacerbated by the increasingly blurred boundary between work and private
life.9 Employer-provided equipment is frequently used for personal as well as
work-related communications, while employees are increasingly being
encouraged to access work materials on their own personal devices, which are
used for off-duty purposes as well.10
If one were to examine the legal implications of the growing use of social
media solely within the frame of employment discrimination law, one concern
would likely predominate: how to prevent discriminatory harassment,
particularly sexual harassment. Title VII prohibits discrimination based on
certain protected characteristics, including sex,11 and the Supreme Court has
made clear that harassing behavior constitutes discrimination when it is
“sufficiently severe or pervasive” to create a hostile work environment.12
While actionable harassment can occur along other protected dimensions, such

9. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 CHI.-KENT L.
REV., 901, 901–02 (2012); Patricia Sánchez Abril, Avner Levin & Alissa Del Riego, Blurred
Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 63,
64 (2012); Ariana R. Levinson, Toward a Cohesive Interpretation of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act for the Electronic Monitoring of Employees, 114 W. VA. L. REV.
461, 467–68 (2012); Robert Sprague, Invasion of the Social Networks: Blurring the Line Between
Personal Life and the Employment Relationship, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 1 (2011); Robert
Sprague, Orwell Was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the United States and Its DeEvolution for American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83, 83–84 (2008).
10. See, e.g., Mintz v. Mark Bartelstein & Assocs., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 987, 999 (C.D. Cal.
2012) (finding plaintiff had a limited expectation of privacy in personal mobile phone used to
make business calls and paid for in part by employer); Yaron Dori & Jeff Kosseff, Employers
Must Obtain Employee Consent For BYOD Programs, LAW360 (May 24, 2013, 11:12 AM),
http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/cfc92c70-1ddd-4ce0-9a88-25ec908324df/Presentation/Pub
licationAttachment/f2476f96-c4d4-4dd3-b575-28614fc436f1/Employers_Must_Obtain_Employ
ee_Consent_for_BYOD_Programs.pdf (reporting trend among companies to require workers to
“bring their own devices” to access work email and other work-related applications).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
12. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
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as race or national origin, the overwhelming majority of harassment cases have
involved charges of sexual harassment.13 The existence of a sexually hostile
work environment may be established based on sexual advances or jokes by
supervisors or co-workers, the use of degrading language, or the presence of
pornography or highly sexualized images in the workplace. Many of the
behaviors that could give rise to a hostile work environment—propositions, the
sharing of pornography, highly sexualized or derogatory language and jokes—
can occur as easily via electronic communications as in face-to-face
interactions, and so the growth of social media seems to expand the avenues by
which discriminatory harassment might occur. And because co-workers may
communicate with one another outside of work on social media platforms,
questions arise regarding the employers’ responsibility for comments and
behaviors occurring outside the workplace and off-duty.14
Given the risks of legal liability for sexual harassment, the employment
discrimination frame might suggest that employers should engage in extensive
monitoring of their employees’ activities on all social media platforms,
whether engaged in on- or off-duty, and discipline them for any activities that
violate employer-imposed norms of propriety. This impulse to monitor is likely
reinforced by case law establishing the contours of an employer’s vicarious
liability for harassment. In Ellerth and Faragher, the Supreme Court held that
an employer could avoid vicarious liability for a hostile work environment
created by a supervisory employee if the employer “exercised reasonable care
to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,” and the
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of employer-provided
opportunities to address the harassment.15 Although much of the subsequent
case law focused on the adequacy of employers’ sexual harassment complaint
procedures and the “reasonableness” of employee behavior, an open question
remains as to what other steps an employer must take to prevent harassing
behavior in order to take advantage of the affirmative defense.
Consideration of employment discrimination law raises other concerns
about the use of social media. An employee’s or applicant’s online activities
can reveal a host of personal information, including information about
protected characteristics that might not otherwise be apparent to the employer.

13. See CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 1, at 637.
14. See, e.g., Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 543 (N.J. 2000) (holding
employer would be liable for failing to remedy workplace harassment based on statements posted
by co-employees on electronic bulletin board); Amira-Jabbar v. Travel Servs., Inc., 726 F. Supp.
2d 77, 85–86 (D.P.R. 2010) (granting employer’s summary judgment on racial harassment claim
that included allegation that a co-worker had posted an offensive racial comment on Facebook).
See also Jeremy Gelms, High-Tech Harassment: Employer Liability Under Title VII for
Employee Social Media Misconduct, 87 WASH. L. REV. 249, 249–50, 269–72 (2012).
15. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
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For example, online posts by an individual, or her associates, might disclose
her religion, the existence of a disability, or an intimate association with
someone of another race, all prohibited bases for making employment
decisions under anti-discrimination laws.16 Online postings may also reveal an
individual’s family medical history, a form of genetic information. Under the
recently enacted Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act,17 however,
employers are prohibited not only from taking adverse actions based on an
employee’s, or applicant’s, genetic traits, but also from requesting or collecting
such information.18 Using the frame of employment discrimination law thus
focuses attention on the particular traits protected by law and how social media
might make employees more vulnerable to adverse actions based on those
protected characteristics.
Examined from the perspective of employment law, however, the tension
over employee use of social media has a different cast. Employment law has
long been concerned with individual rights of workers, including their interests
in autonomy and in avoiding dignitary harms. Thus, when considering social
media, concerns about employee privacy and speech come to the fore.
Although in some ways just another mode of communication, social media—
and electronic communications more broadly—present distinct challenges.
Unlike more traditional forms of communication, electronic communications
can be easily monitored in real time or permanently stored for later retrieval
and analysis. They can also be infinitely and exactly replicated and distributed
to large numbers of people almost instantaneously. As individuals move more
of their personal lives online, the details of their associations, activities, and
beliefs are increasingly vulnerable to surveillance and subsequent disclosure,
including by or to their employers
The growing use of social media thus raises complex issues about when
and under what circumstances employers may legitimately access employees’
personal accounts. Courts have struggled to define when an individual
employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy,19 and how statutory

16. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (religion);
The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a) (2006) (disability); Holcomb v. Iona
Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2008) (association); Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac,
Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 994–95 (6th Cir. 1999) (association);
Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986) (association).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff to -11 (2012).
18. Id. § 2000ff-1(b). The Act makes it unlawful for an employer to “request, require or
purchase genetic information” subject to certain exceptions.
19. Compare Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1234, 1236 (D. Nev. 1996)
(finding no expectation of privacy in pager messages), and Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp.
97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding employee did not have reasonable expectation of privacy in
messages sent over company owned e-mail system) with Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc.,
990 A.2d 650, 663 (N.J. 2010) (concluding employee had reasonable expectation of privacy in
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limitations on electronic access created in an era predating Facebook or
MySpace should apply to social media platforms.20 What is the legal
significance, for example, of privacy settings established by the employee? Or
the fact that the individual’s account is password protected? Does a “friend”
request by a supervisor threaten an employee’s personal privacy? Legislatures
have begun to step in, with nearly a dozen states passing statutes to protect
employee privacy by prohibiting employers from requesting or requiring that
employees or applicants turn over their passwords to their social media
accounts.21 Pushing against greater protection of employee privacy are
employers’ needs to safeguard trade secrets and other confidential business
information.
Social media platforms are not only vehicles for personal communications,
but also fora for the individual to express her opinions and concerns to a
broader public. Precisely because social media is such a powerful tool for
broadcasting opinions, employees have an interest in using it to engage in
unfettered speech—whether for purposes of self-expression or advocacy on
public issues. And for precisely the same reason, employers may fear that an
employee’s publicly-expressed opinions may cause reputational or other harm
to the firm. Thus, the speech aspects of social media are another locus of
tension in the employment relationship. Public employees have alleged that
employer retaliation for their speech and associations on social media violate

email exchanged with her attorney on her personal, password-protected email account accessed
through a company-provided laptop computer), and Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness
Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding former employee had reasonable
expectation of privacy in personal, password-protected email accounts). The Supreme Court
recently declined to decide the question of whether a public employee had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in personal text messages sent on an employer-provided pager in City of
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629–30 (2010).
20. See Stored Communications Act, Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2006); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113–14
(3d Cir. 2004); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002); Pietrylo v.
Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06–5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108834, at *18–20. (D.N.J. July 25,
2008).
21. To date, the following states have enacted such statutes: Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. §
11–2–124 (2013); California, CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(b) (West 2013); Maryland, MD. CODE
ANN., LABOR & EMPL. § 3–712 (West 2013); Illinois, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/10 (2013);
Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.273 (2012) UTAH, UTAH CODE ANN. § 34–48–201 (2013);
New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50–4–34 (2013); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 8–2–127
(2013); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.0003 (2013); and New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:6B-6 (2013). Similar legislation is pending in the U.S. Congress. See Michael O. Loatman,
Congress May Limit Employer Access to Personal Social Media Accounts, 28 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA), Feb. 11, 2013, at 23 (reporting that a proposed Social Networking Online Protection Act
(SNOPA) was introduced in Congress).
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their First Amendment rights.22 Employees in the private sector generally lack
legal protection for their individual off-duty expression,23 and numerous
instances of workers losing their jobs because of their online activities outside
the workplace have been reported.24 Given the lack of legal regulation in this
area, private firms are increasingly promulgating social media policies that
attempt to establish standards for their employees’ social media use, even offduty, on pain of discipline or discharge, while scholars have argued for explicit
legal protection for the speech rights of private sector workers.25
Even though employees may lack robust legal protection under doctrines
intended to protect individual speech and privacy, retaliation for certain forms
of employee speech can give rise to employer liability. In particular, speech
among employees relating to shared workplace concerns, such as wages, hours,
or working conditions are protected as a form of collective activity. Thus,
examining employees’ social media use from a labor law perspective
highlights a new set of legal issues. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) broadly protects workers’ rights to self-organization,
encompassing not only formal union organizing, but also all “concerted
activity” undertaken for “mutual aid or protection.”26 Numerous National
Labor Relations Board (Board) and court decisions have established that these

22. These claims have met with varying degrees of success. See, e.g., Bland v. Roberts, No.
12–1671, 2013 WL 5228033, *15–16 (4th Cir. Sept. 18, 2013) (holding that ‘‘liking’’ the
Facebook campaign page of a candidate for sheriff was constitutionally protected speech);
Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11CV00215 JLH, 2011 WL 5184283, at *4 (E.D. Ark., Nov. 1,
2011) (holding that plaintiff’s Facebook post referring to the firing of several fellow employees in
the Circuit Clerk’s office was constitutionally protected speech). But see Gresham v. City of
Atlanta, No. 1:10-CV-1301-RWS, 2011 WL 4601020, at *2, *5 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2011)
(finding police officer’s Facebook comments constitutionally protected, but concluding that
government’s interest in efficiency outweighed plaintiff’s interest in speech and therefore no First
Amendment violation occurred).
23. The First Amendment restricts government, not non-state actors, although it could
provide a public policy basis for protecting private sector employees from retaliation for their
speech. See, e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir.1983). In addition, a
handful of states have statutes that protect private employee speech, or related interests, such as
political activity. See Eugene Volokh, Private Employees’ Speech and Political Activity:
Statutory Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L & POL. 295, 313–33 (2012).
Employee speech might also be protected if it falls within a specific statutory or common law
protection for whistleblower speech—that is, speech reporting or objecting to specified types of
unlawful employer practices. See Kim, supra note 9, at 924. For the most part, however, private
employees’ off-duty speech unrelated to the workplace is not legally protected.
24. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 9, at 912–13; Robert Sprague, Fired for Blogging: Are There
Legal Protections for Employees Who Blog?, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 355, 357–58 (2007).
25. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley & Ryan P. McGinley-Stempel, Beyond the Water Cooler:
Speech and the Workplace in an Era of Social Media, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 75, 79–80
(2012).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
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rights apply not only when workers belong to a union or are attempting to form
a union, but to unorganized workers as well, even though they may not have
any conscious intent to organize at the time.27 These precedents have
recognized that in order to meaningfully protect the right to organize, informal
joint discussions among employees—the precursors to group action—must
also be protected.28 Even individual activity may be protected as concerted
where “individual employees seek to initiate, to induce, or to prepare for group
action, as well as individual employees bringing truly group complaints to the
attention of management.”29
In a series of recent decisions, the Board has made clear that these section
7 protections can apply to workers’ discussions on social media.30 For
example, the Board found that several employees were engaged in protected
concerted activity when they complained about their supervisor in a
conversation on Facebook. The Facebook discussion had followed a meeting in
which the workers raised concerns about their safety when closing the
employer’s store after most of the businesses in the area had already closed.
The administrative law judge viewed their Facebook posts as a continuation of
that group effort to address their concerns, but the Board concluded “the
Facebook postings would have constituted protected concerted activity in and
of themselves” because they related to their terms and conditions of
employment.31 Thus, the employer’s decision to discharge the employees
because of their Facebook posts constituted a violation of section 8(a)(1).32
The Board has also scrutinized employers’ social media policies for
compliance with the NLRA. Prior Board authority established that a work rule

27. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962); NLRB v. Phx. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948); NLRB v.
Guernsey-Muskigum Elec. Coop., Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 12 (6th Cir. 1960); Timekeeping Sys., Inc.,
323 N.L.R.B. 244, 247–48 (1977).
28. Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at a General
Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1701 (1989).
29. Meyers Indus., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986).
30. See, e.g., Design Tech. Grp., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 96, 2012–2013 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶
15,687 (Apr. 19, 2013); Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, 2012–2013 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) ¶ 15,620 (Sept. 28, 2012); Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012–
2013 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15,656 (Dec. 14, 2012). The status of these decisions is uncertain after
the D.C. Circuit held in Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 506–07 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013), that since January 2012 three of the Board’s members have
lacked constitutionally valid appointments, leaving the Board without a quorum to take lawful
action. See, e.g., New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2642 (2010). Nevertheless,
the issue is likely to recur, as the Board has received numerous charges alleging interference with
protected rights based on employer’s retaliation for employees’ use of social media and many
similar cases are pending.
31. Design Tech. Grp., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 96.
32. Id.
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violated section 8(a)(1) when the rule “would reasonably tend to chill
employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.”33 Even if the rule does not
explicitly prohibit section 7 activities, it is unlawful if “employees would
reasonably construe the language to prohibit section 7 activity.”34 The Board
has recently found that an employee handbook that broadly prohibits any
online statements “that damage the Company, defame any individual or
damage any person’s reputation clearly encompass[ed] concerted
communications protesting . . . treatment of [] employees” and therefore
violated 8(a)(1).35 In another case, the Board found that an employer’s Social
Media Policy unlawfully restricted employees’ section 7 rights where it
prohibited employees from making “disparaging or defamatory comments”
about the employer or making negative comments online during “Company
time.”36
Viewed through a labor law lens, social media use by employees raises
both the possibility and the attendant risks of collective activity. The labor laws
were intended to redress the imbalance of power between the employer and
individual employees by permitting workers to join together and bargain as a
group. One of the challenges for workers seeking to organize a union is how to
reach and engage with others who might share similar concerns about
workplace conditions. The traditional deference accorded the employer to
control its property and the production process has made organizational efforts
at the workplace difficult,37 while reaching a dispersed group of workers after
hours also poses challenges. Social networking sites, listserves and the like
open a new avenue for reaching and engaging co-workers—the sort of
precursors to group action protected under section 7. And yet, the ubiquity and
informality of communications on social media often make it difficult to
characterize the nature of these interactions. Are online complaints about work
by an employee an initial step toward group action? Or merely unprotected
griping by the individual?38 And how far can an employer go in promulgating

33. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 825 (1998).
34. Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 647 (2004). In addition, a rule may be
unlawful without explicitly prohibiting section 7 activities if “the rule was promulgated in
response to union activity; or . . . the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7
rights.” Id.
35. Costco Wholesale Corp., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 2012–2013 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶
15,602 (Sept. 7, 2012).
36. Dish Network Corp., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 2012–2013 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15,695
(Apr. 30, 2013).
37. See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527, 532–33 (1992).
38. See, e.g., Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012–2013 NLRB
Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15,656 (Dec. 14, 2012) (Hayes, J., dissenting) (arguing that Facebook postings
were “mere griping” not protected concerted activity).
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policies to protect its reputation and proprietary information before they would
“tend to chill employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights?”39
Our purpose here is not to resolve, or even to catalog in a comprehensive
way, the many legal issues arising from the intersection of social media use
and the workplace. Rather, the point is to provide a concrete illustration of the
limitations of the traditional tripartite division of work law into the study of
employment discrimination, employment law, and labor law. Using any of
these frames alone presents a distorted and highly incomplete picture of the
issues raised by employees’ use of social media. Simply put, those challenges
cannot be understood without taking a holistic perspective on the issue, one
that brings to bear insights from all three doctrinal areas. Similarly, the
communicative potential of social media offers possibilities and risks across
traditional boundaries. Individual employees may use social media to engage
in whistleblowing; unions may use it as a channel for organizing workers; and
plaintiffs’ lawyers may use it to reach potential members in a collective action.
In short, students who cannot recognize how an issue like the use and
regulation of social media in the workplace raises issues across doctrinal
boundaries are not prepared to practice law. We believe that a holistic
approach to teaching law—one that constantly keeps in view the competing
frames through which we might approach conflicting interests in the
workplace—is necessary to teach students when and how to transcend
doctrinal boundaries.
II. INDIVIDUAL VERSUS COLLECTIVE ACTION: LEVERAGING GROUP POWER
As the preceding materials on social media illustrate, individual
vulnerability to employer power circumscribes the ability to exercise voice in
the workplace. The limited bargaining power that individual employees
possess also renders substantive rights assertion and enforcement challenging.
Workers have historically sought to leverage power by banding together—
whether as plaintiffs in class or collective actions, through more informal
workplace networks, or in formal organizations like unions. Employers have
resisted these efforts vigorously, characterizing the employment relation as
primarily a matter of individual contract and highlighting the role of individual
agency. By tracing the ebb and flow of such efforts and the law’s response to
them, we use the theme of the struggle to leverage group power to demonstrate
the relationships between what at first blush might seem to be disparate areas
of work law.
In a holistic Work Law course, we begin by covering labor law principles
at a relatively superficial level to provide the theoretical backdrop for this
theme. The struggle for power in labor law is patent. The law explicitly

39. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 825 (1998).
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protects workers’ rights to make common cause by forming a union as a device
to leverage, and thus equalize, bargaining power.40 We then segue to the rise of
the individual rights regime, pointing out how labor unions advanced workers’
power by lobbying for legislation protecting individual employment rights,
including most of the statutes that are more typically covered in Employment
Law and Employment Discrimination.41 These statutes serve to raise the floor
from which unions bargain for their members,42 but they also advance the
interests of workers as a class. However, the rights themselves—unlike those
created by the NLRA—are conceptualized as fundamentally individual in
nature.43 And therein lies the dilemma: given the small amounts at stake for
low wage workers, how many individual employees will be able to persuade a
private attorney to take the case, and how many will possess the financial and
psychological/emotional resources to persevere when the employer mounts
sustained resistance? Although unions sometimes are able to use class actions
under these statutes as catalysts to “galvanize nascent forms of collective
organization,”44 workers more often rely upon the efforts of union substitutes
to leverage group power, including plaintiffs’ class action lawyers, nonprofit
workers’ centers, and administrative agencies.45 We ask whether these entities

40. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). The Court upheld the statute
against constitutional challenge in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., explaining:
Long ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. We said that they were organized
out of the necessities of the situation; that a single employee was helpless in dealing with
an employer; that he was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of
himself and family; that if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair,
he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment;
that union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their
employer.
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
41. CRAIN, KIM & SELMI, supra note 1, at 31.
42. Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25 U.S.F. L. REV.
169, 174–87, 192 (1991).
43. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review
and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 395 (2002).
44. Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2689
(2008). Such efforts are complicated by the labor law doctrine that unions impermissibly
influence election results (i.e. engage in vote-buying) when they provide prospective bargaining
unit members with free legal services in a class action wage or civil rights action filed during an
organizing drive prior to a union election. See, e.g., Nestle Ice Cream Co. v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 578,
579 (6th Cir. 1995); Freund Baking Co. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 928, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Detroit
Auto Auction, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 97–6487, 98–5096, 1999 WL 435160, at *2 (6th Cir. July 17,
1999).
45. See Alan Hyde, New Institutions for Worker Representation in the United States:
Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 385 (2006) (discussing efforts of alternative worker
organizations that function more like social justice movements than like traditional unions).
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are likely to be as effective as unions in this endeavor,46 or whether other
agendas may threaten to overwhelm their efforts. In particular, do class actions
engage workers as active agents in resisting their own exploitation and produce
the sorts of lasting and forward-looking changes that unionization and
collective bargaining offer, or are they simply vehicles for financial recoveries
for lawyers? 47
In the litigation context, aggregation of claims offers significant
advantages over individual rights enforcement for addressing workplace power
differentials. Class claims help to equalize resources between the disputants,
respond to the asymmetries of market information for workers and employers,
and facilitate deterrence and forward-looking resolution of claims as well as
compensation for past rights violations.48 Congress, government agencies, and
the courts have at some points in history actively supported aggregation of
claims, but in recent years the courts have demonstrated increasing hostility
toward collective action.49 Most employment law and employment
discrimination professors cover the shifting approach to class and collective
claims as matters of evolving procedural law, rather than as a struggle to
leverage collective worker power. By approaching the cases in the traditional
46. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension
Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 575, 593, 624, 637–38 (1992) (explaining unique role played by unions and
collective bargaining in workplace governance and arguing that the collective bargaining system
is superior to individual employment protections because it enhances voice, improves
productivity, allows for flexibility and fosters efficiency, enhances enforcement, and offers more
stability).
47. See Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action
Employment Discrimination and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (2003) (arguing that
class litigation is focused on remedying past discrimination rather than altering the workplace
structure to prevent future discrimination, and observing that incentive structures for attorneys
and diversity task forces are poorly aligned with the goal of furthering forward-looking change).
48. Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 146 (2011).
49. Nantiya Ruan, Facilitating Wage Theft: How Courts Use Procedural Rules to
Undermine Substantive Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 728, 759–60 (2010).
Legislative and judicial hostility toward group action in the litigation context is not limited to the
labor and employment law field. See Resnik, supra note 48, at 145–46 (explaining how resistance
to class action opportunities has spanned the economic spectrum, from litigation efforts by Legal
Services on behalf of the poor to securities litigation); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading,
Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal
Civil Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 318 (2013) (examining recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence on federal civil procedure and concluding that it is “decidedly pro-business,” in part
because it makes aggregation of individual claims in public fora very difficult, reducing the
plaintiffs’ choice to one “between collective access to the judicial system or no access at all”);
Adam Liptak, Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, (May 4, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-defining-this-supremecourt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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way, however, we miss opportunities to show students how these cases connect
to the larger theme of the struggle to leverage power, why they are so hardfought, and the difference that the outcome makes on the ground.
A series of seemingly disparate cases from employment discrimination and
employment law contexts illustrate the pendulum swings of the law as
employers seek to deal with employees individually, workers resist by
attempting collective action, and law responds, leading in turn to strategic
responses from employers and new tactics by workers struggling to leverage
group power. For example, in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, the Supreme Court
vacated certification of a nationwide class of women workers at Wal-Mart who
alleged that a corporate policy of discretion to local mangers and corporate
officers combined with a culture replete with sex stereotyping resulted in
discriminatory pay and promotion decisions.50 The Court found that the
proposed class did not satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.51 After the Court found the class action
inappropriate in the absence of a specific discriminatory company policy,
many lower courts have applied Dukes to block class action discrimination
suits where the plaintiffs rely on aggregate statistics, expert testimony, and
discretionary managerial decision making to prove discrimination.52 Thus, the

50. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548, 2556–57 (2011).
51. Id. at 2550–57.
52. See, e.g., Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476, 486–489 (6th Cir. 2013) (applying Dukes
and denying certification of proposed nationwide sex discrimination class action by female
applicants rejected for positions as sales representatives; plaintiffs used statistical evidence and
expert testimony to support allegations of a white male-dominated business culture that was
replicated through subjective hiring decisions); Stockwell v. City of San Francisco, No. C 08–
5180 PJH, 2011 WL 4803505, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011) (denying class certification where
employees alleged only aggregate statistical evidence of disproportionate impact); Bell v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 08–6292 (RBK/AMD), 2011 WL 6256978, at *6–7 (D.N.J. Dec. 14,
2011) (denying certification where managerial discretionary decisionmaking would have to be
examined in the individual context of each employee’s circumstances). Nevertheless, the Dukes
bar has not proved to be completely insurmountable. Where plaintiffs are able to identify a
specific discriminatory policy and the class size is significantly smaller than the Dukes class,
some courts have allowed certification. See, e.g., Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D.
492, 509, 545 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (certifying class action where plaintiffs were able to identify a
discriminatory policy at the top ranks of management, and distinguishing Dukes because
plaintiffs there challenged a lack of policy that allowed discrimination to flourish at lower levels);
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 488–91 (7th Cir.
2012) (certifying class action race discrimination case where class size of 700 was sufficiently
limited to avoid placing undue pressure on the employer to settle, and distinguishing Dukes based
on class size of 1.4 million which might coerce the defendant into settling simply to avoid the risk
of financial destruction); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 113, 117–19
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting class certification where plaintiffs alleged companywide policies). See
also Linda S. Mullenix, A Year After ‘Wal-Mart,’ Class Actions Not Dead Yet, NAT’L L.J., June
11, 2012, at 10 (reviewing federal district court decisions that distinguished Dukes and permitted
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possibility for success on such claims has been significantly diminished.
Because Rule 23 does not apply to the EEOC, one might posit that its systemic
litigation program could be the mainstay of employment discrimination class
actions under Title VII in situations where a specific discriminatory policy is
not readily identifiable.53 But the EEOC and equivalent state agencies are
increasingly overwhelmed with claims,54 leaving private lawyers as the
primary watchdogs for civil rights enforcement.
Similar enforcement challenges plague wage and hour law. The provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) can be enforced through civil actions
brought either by the Secretary of Labor or by the aggrieved workers
themselves.55 Wage and hour violations are widespread, and the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor is overwhelmed.56 Individual
workers struggle to find a lawyer willing to take their cases, since the typical
recovery under the FLSA for any individual worker is low. Until recently,

class certification where plaintiffs were able to identify a specific common policy and practice,
and arguing that forecasts of the demise of class litigation may be premature).
53. By the end of 2012, twenty percent of the EEOC’s litigation docket consisted of
systemic cases. Lydell C. Bridgeford, EEOC’s Systemic Program Set to Fill Gap in Private Class
Actions, Attorneys Predict, 244 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) (Dec. 19, 2012), at A-5, A-6; see EEOC
Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 through FY 2012, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/en
forcement/litigation.cfm (last visited Aug. 24, 2013).
54. In the last three years, the EEOC has processed close to 100,000 claims of workplace
discrimination per year. See Charge Statistics, FY 1997 through FY 2012, EEOC, http://www1.ee
oc.gov//eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Aug. 24, 2013); see also Michael
Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment Discrimination
Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 56–58 (1996) (arguing that volume of claims and lengthy and
cumbersome administrative process might justify abolishing the agency and allowing plaintiffs to
proceed directly to court).
55. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 204(f) (2006).
56. See Lawrence E. Dubé, Labor Solicitor Sees Low-Wage Epidemic and Urges Employers
to Take ‘High Road’, 109 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) June 6, 2013, at AA-1 (describing mismatch
between staffing at Department of Labor and high rate of noncompliance with wage and hour
laws, and discussing enforcement difficulties); Annette Bernhardt et al., Broken Laws,
Unprotected Workers: Violations of Employment and Labor Laws in America’s Cities,
NELP.ORG, 2, 5, http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1
(last visited Aug. 23, 2013) (reporting on results of survey of low wage workers in four cities
finding that two-thirds of the workers had suffered some form of wage violation during the
preceding week, with the average worker losing fifteen percent of her earnings as a result).
Further, a forensic audit performed by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2008–09
concluded that the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division was quite ineffective in its
enforcement mechanisms, offering a confusing and discouraging complaint intake process, failing
to record complaints, failing to investigate, failing to use all available enforcement tools, and
characterized by lengthy delays. GAO’s Undercover Investigation: Wage Theft of America’s
Vulnerable Workers Hearing Before the H. Comm.on Educ. & Labor, 111th Cong. 36–37 (2009)
(statement of Greg Kutz, Managing Director, U.S. Government Accountability Office); Steven
Greenhouse, Labor Agency is Failing Workers, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, at A16.
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however, collective action claims under the FLSA have been quite attractive to
the plaintiffs’ bar. Unlike class actions, collective actions under the FLSA are
opt-in claims, and they require plaintiffs only to be “similarly situated,” a
standard that has historically been easier to satisfy than Rule 23’s commonality
requirement.57 In 2013, the Supreme Court threw a monkey wrench into the
mix, however, when it ruled that employers may “pick off” the lead plaintiff in
an FLSA collective action by offering her all the relief she has requested so
that her personal interest in the litigation is eliminated; if no other employees
have joined the action at that point, the lead plaintiff cannot seek relief for
similarly situated workers, and the case must be dismissed.58
Workers’ ability to leverage power through collective action wage and
hour claims is further hindered by the spillover of the Dukes rationale.
Although some courts have held that the Dukes enhanced commonality
requirements are completely inapplicable to wage and hour claims under the
FLSA,59 others have extended the Dukes reasoning to the FLSA context.60
Additionally, in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, a consumer-initiated class action
antitrust claim by current and former Comcast subscribers in the Philadelphia
area, the Court erected another hurdle to class claims, requiring that plaintiffs
establish at the class certification stage that individual injury will be capable of

57. See David Borgen & Laura L. Ho, Litigation of Wage and Hour Collective Actions under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 129, 130–31 (2003) (describing
differences between the two types of actions); Daniel C. Lopez, Note, Collective Confusion:
FLSA Collective Actions, Rule 23 Class Actions, and the Rules Enabling Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
275, 278, 309 (2009) (discussing hybrid actions combining state law wage and hour claims and
FLSA collective action claims and arguing that joinder is confusing and that the two theories are
in fundamental tension with one another; the author proposes repealing the collective action
vehicle under the FLSA).
58. Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1527–32 (2013).
59. See, e.g., Essame v. SSC Laurel Operating Co., 847 F. Supp. 2d 821, 828 (D. Md. 2012)
(stating that Rule 23 standards are “generally inapplicable” to FLSA collective actions and
certifying plaintiff class in overtime pay case); Creely v. HCR ManorCare, Inc., Nos. 3:09 CV
2879, 3:10 CV 417, 3:10 CV 2200, 2011 WL 3794142, at *1–2 (N.D. Ohio July 1, 2011)
(refusing to apply Dukes to FLSA collective action for overtime pay, and granting conditional
certification at the earliest phase of the action; final certification was ultimately denied, but the
court did not cite Dukes), final certification denied, 920 F. Supp. 2d 846.
60. See, e.g., Ealy v. Pinkerton Gov’t Servs., Inc., 514 F. App’x. 299, 304 (4th Cir. 2013)
(applying Dukes to an FLSA claim); MacGregor v. Farmers Ins. Exch., No. 2:10–CV–03088,
2011 WL 2981466, at *4 (D.S.C. July 22, 2011) (finding Dukes treatment of Rule 23’s
commonality requirement “illuminating” at the conditional certification stage in an FLSA
collective action suit); Wang v. Chinese Daily News, 709 F.3d 829, 832, 836 (9th Cir. 2013)
(vacating original opinion certifying California state law wage and hour claims as a class action
and FLSA claims as a collective action following remand by Supreme Court, and instruction to
reconsider the decision in light of Dukes); see also Forrand v. Fed. Express Corp., No. CV 08–
1360 DSF (PJWx), 2013 WL 1793951, at *1, *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2013) (refusing to certify
class under California wage and hour law, citing Dukes).
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proof at trial through evidence common to the class, and that damages are
measurable on a class-wide basis.61 The Comcast analysis, too, was soon
applied to wage and hour claims.62 A recent high-profile case involving a class
of former interns at Hearst Corporation who argued that they had been
misclassified as interns rather than employees and thus were owed back wages
suffered a defeat at the class certification stage; the district court judge cited
both Dukes and Comcast in support of his decision.63
In still another line of cases, workers bound by predispute arbitration
agreements signed as a condition of obtaining employment have attempted to
leverage group power by bringing class claims before arbitrators. The typical
predispute arbitration agreement waives the right to proceed on statutory or
common law claims arising out of employment in court or administrative fora
in exchange for a private dispute resolution process. In cases involving such
waivers, the question has arisen whether a waiver of the right to bring class
claims in both public fora and in arbitration is enforceable. In AT&T Mobility
v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court ruled in a consumer context that such a
waiver was enforceable, relying on the pro-arbitration policy of the Federal
Arbitration Act.64 In 2013, the Court went further still in an antitrust context,
ruling that a class action waiver is enforceable even where the cost of proving
an individual claim exceeds the potential recovery, preventing (as the plaintiffs
argued) the effective vindication of federal statutory rights.65 Relying heavily
on Concepcion, the majority held that the policy favoring arbitration requires
that arbitration agreements be strictly enforced; the effective vindication
exception established in the Court’s earlier cases does not apply simply
because a claim is expensive to prove.66 In a powerful dissent, Justice Kagan
argued that the Court’s decision allows the more powerful party to a contract to
use its power to coerce agreement to contract terms that essentially eliminate
its liability, while the statutory rights remain superficially intact.67
61. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1430, 1435 (2013).
62. See Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., No. 3:10–CV–0591 (TJM/DEP), 2013 WL 1316452, at
*3 (Mar. 29, 2013) (lower court applied Comcast to deny certification to class of Applebee’s
employees suing under state law for unpaid wages because monetary relief would have to be
calculated individually for each member of the class), appeal filed, available at http://www.citi
zen.org/documents/Roach-v-Cannon-Corp-Petition-Appeal-Class-Certification.pdf (2d Cir. April
12, 2013). But see Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 513–16 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding
that district court abused its discretion in denying class certification in wage and hour claim under
California law and distinguishing Comcast because data for calculating damages could be readily
culled from the company’s electronic payroll and timekeeping database).
63. Wang v. Hearst Corp., No. 12 CV 793(HB), 2013 WL 1903787, at *6–10 (S.D.N.Y.
May 8, 2013).
64. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011).
65. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2307–12 (2013).
66. Id. at 2309–10.
67. Id. at 2313–16 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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But suppose that the ban on class claims offends the policy explicitly
advanced by another federal statute, such as the NLRA? In D.R. Horton, Inc.,
the NLRB ruled that a class action waiver in an employment arbitration
agreement interfered with employees’ NLRA section 7 rights to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection.68 The Board reasoned that collective pursuit of a workplace
grievance in arbitration is part of the concerted legal action historically
protected under the NLRA. Although employers may require employees to
pursue arbitral proceedings on an individual basis, they may not compel
employees to waive their rights to collectively pursue litigation of
employment-related claims in all forums. The case is currently on appeal to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,69 but so far, most courts have
rejected the Board’s reasoning, believing it inconsistent with the Court’s ruling
in Concepcion and the Federal Arbitration Act.70
It is perhaps easiest to appreciate the role of leveraging power in a Labor
Law course. Nearly the entire semester in a traditional Labor Law course is
spent examining the evolution of unionism as a tool to enhance worker power,
and the law’s efforts first to repress it,71 then to support it,72 and ultimately to
68. D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012–13 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15546 (Jan. 3,
2012) appeal docketed, No. 12-60031 (5th Cir. argued May 31, 2012).
69. Id. For an excellent and prescient analysis of the issues involved in harmonizing
mandatory arbitration agreements with NLRA rights, see Ann C. Hodges, Can Compulsory
Arbitration Be Reconciled with Section 7 Rights?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 217–18 (2003).
70. See, e.g., Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP, No. 11–17530, 2013 WL 4437601 (9th Cir.
Aug. 21, 2013) (asserting that D.R. Horton cannot be reconciled with Concepcion); Sutherland v.
Ernst & Young, LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013) (declining to follow D.R. Horton); Owen v.
Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that the court is not required to
defer to the NLRB’s interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, and “that arbitration agreements
containing class waivers are enforceable in claims brought under the FLSA”); Delock v. Securitas
Sec. Servs. USA, 883 F. Supp. 2d 784, 787 (E.D. Ark.2012) (holding that the NLRB has no
special experience with the FAA and its decisions interpreting the FAA are not necessarily
entitled to deference).
71. Labor activism was initially treated as an act of criminal conspiracy, and workers were
tried and convicted for forming combinations “injurious to the public good.” Workers’ demands
for higher wages were cast as efforts to “artificially” raise the prices of items that they produced,
harming consumers and the community; criminal penalties were thus appropriate. See Transcript
of Record, Commonwealth v. Pulis (Philadelphia Cordwainers Case), Mayor’s Ct. Phila. (1806),
reprinted in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 62–69, 228–33
(John R. Commons et al. eds., 3d ed. 1910). Combinations of workers were also seen as
potentially dangerous, likely to resort to violence, and disruptive to commerce (and ultimately,
threatening to the market structure). See Morris D. Forkosch, The Doctrine of Criminal
Conspiracy and its Modern Application to Labor, 40 TEX. L. REV. 303, 318–20 (1962)
(discussing how the English common law viewed combinations of workers to raise wages and
reduce hours as an unlawful conspiracy, and how this view was accepted in the earliest days of
the American republic). Early courts also routinely issued injunctions against strikes and
picketing, a remedy that because of its timeliness was even more effective than criminal
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adopt a private ordering regime featuring contract and dispute resolution
mechanisms designed to channel worker protest toward therapeutic outlets for
discussion and (hopefully) compromise.73 Even professors who strive to retain
a posture of ideological neutrality will find themselves embroiled in class
discussions of cases that turn on the question of the balance of power and the
interplay between law, self-help by employers, and group action by workers.74
Employer resistance to traditional union organizing is manifest in wellfinanced anti-union campaigns, and many employer-side lawyers are essential
participants in this effort.75 Cases involving employer bargaining obligations
routinely chastise the National Labor Relations Board for placing its thumb on
one side of the scale, admonish the Board that it should not pass on the

prosecution in suppressing labor unionism. See Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1078 (Mass.
1896). See William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1109, 1179 (1989) (discussing judicial repression of the “semi-outlawry” of collective
action by labor unions); JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR
LAW 7–8 (1983) (discussing law’s hostility and concern with the risk of “anarchy” stemming
from collective action).
72. See Wagner Act of 1935 § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (stating that it was the policy of the
United States to encourage the practice of collective bargaining and full freedom of worker selforganization). Covered employees were afforded the right to organize and employers were
required to bargain collectively with them through representatives of their choosing. The right
was made effective through the proscription of employer unfair labor practices.
73. See General Electric Co., 150 N.L.R.B 192, 194 (1964) (explaining that good faith
bargaining entails “the serious intent to adjust differences and to reach an acceptable common
ground”) (quoting 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 85 (1936). Some have been more critical of the functions
of collective bargaining as defined by American courts. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Judicial
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941,
62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 267 (1978). One of my early students suggested that collective bargaining
was effectively merely “an opium for the people.” KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF HEGEL’S
‘PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT’ 131 (Joseph O’Malley ed., Annette Jolin & Joseph O’Malley trans.,
1970).
74. See ATLESON, supra note 71, at 7–8 (arguing that labor law is coherent only when
consideration is afforded to hidden values and assumptions manifested by legal doctrine); Klare,
supra note 73, at 318–336 (explaining how differing ideologies have pervaded the judicial
process in labor law); James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the
Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1564 (1996) (explaining how law has undermined the
legitimacy of group action); Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: PostWar Labor Law, Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
1, 1 (1999) (explaining how individual rights have supplanted group rights in American work
law).
75. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred: The Intensification of Employer Opposition
to Organizing, ECON. POL’Y INST., 1–2 (May 20, 2009), http://www.epi.org/publication/bp235/
(analyzing employer anti-union strategies in NLRB-supervised elections between 1999 and 2003
and finding extensive use of threats to close the plant, discharges of pro-union workers, and
threats to cut wages and benefits); John Logan, Consultants, Lawyers, and the “Union Free”
Movement in the USA since the 1970s, 33 INDUS. REL. J. 197, 198 (2002) (describing employers’
rising use of anti-union consultants and the tactics that they recommend).
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substantive terms of labor contracts, and often contain sharp-tongued
dissents.76 Cases involving the use of economic weapons in labor disputes,
whether employees’ use of the strike weapon or employers’ resort to lockouts,
turn on whether the Court believes that the Act should be interpreted to afford
more or less protection to workers or to the employer in that circumstance,
which in turn dictates the power balance between the parties in bargaining.77
The law’s alternating receptivity and hostility to group action in NLRA
jurisprudence thus provides a clear organizing theme for the course.78
Viewed in isolation, the employment discrimination and employment law
cases that focus on status-based discrimination theory or procedural
requirements for class claims look quite distinct. When taught in discrete
topical units, these cases present a confusing array of doctrines that students
struggle to master. But when connected to the history of conflict over
leveraging of group power in labor law, these disparate areas can be seen as
part of a larger whole. Students comprehend the various doctrines more readily
and are better equipped to pull arguments from one area into the others and to
predict how the law will next evolve. So, we ask, is some form of group action
essential in the employment context for workers to advance their interests?
Does it make a difference which form the group action assumes—class action,
collective action, class claim in arbitration, or formal unionism and collective
bargaining? How should law advance, cabin, or frame these mechanisms to
achieve justice in the workplace?
CONCLUSION
The two examples discussed here illustrate the difference it makes to adopt
a more comprehensive frame in teaching the law of work rather than adhering
to the traditional tripartite division into labor law, employment discrimination,
and employment law. The first—examining how social media use interacts
with the workplace—highlights the importance of recognizing legal issues
without regard to doctrinal category. Such an approach is not only practically
important, it also helps to deepen student understanding of the competing
interests at stake and how they inter-relate. For example, employee interests in
privacy appear in some tension with efforts to eliminate harassing behavior

76. See, e.g., NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 407–08 (1952) (cautioning the
Board that it could not seek to alter the balance of power by shaping the substantive bargain
struck by the parties; to do so would “disrupt collective bargaining,” which the board was not
empowered to do); H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970) (observing that
fundamental premise of the Act is freedom of contract, with governmental supervision of
procedure only).
77. ATLESON, supra note 71, at 19–34, 44–66.
78. See id. at 7 (arguing that labor law is coherent only when consideration is afforded to
hidden values and assumptions manifested by legal doctrine).
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that may affect the work environment. In other ways, however, privacy rights
and anti-discrimination norms can be mutually reinforcing, as when employees
seek to keep certain personal characteristics, such as genetic or other medical
information, from becoming the basis for employment decisions.79
The second example—the historical and continuing struggle by workers to
leverage group power in dealing with the employer—further illustrates how a
broader frame enriches student comprehension, offering a theme that ties the
course together across time and topics. Looking across doctrinal boundaries
reveals that individual and group conceptions of workers’ interests continually
struggle for dominance, showing how developments in the law lead logically
to a further response as the underlying struggle over power in the workplace
continues. Emphasizing this theme connects seemingly unrelated
developments, making convoluted doctrine more comprehensible and helping
students to begin to predict how the law will evolve next.
The holistic approach to teaching work law we outline here is a
philosophy, not a set curriculum. Such an approach could inform the
development of a stand-alone survey course in a school that only has the
resources to offer one class on a work law topic. However, the approach is also
amenable to use in traditional courses, ensuring that the materials relating to
labor law, employment discrimination, or individual rights are not taught in a
vacuum. A holistic view of the work relationship is particularly useful in the
introductory Employment Law course, where, given the absence of a core
federal statute to offer an organizing theme, the challenge of coherence is most
pressing. Rather than presenting the field as a series of unrelated statutory and
common law doctrines, a more comprehensive view offers organizing themes
and allows students to develop a deeper understanding of the core tensions
underlying all of the law of work.

79. See, Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff–1 (2006)
(prohibiting both discrimination on the basis of genetic characteristics and the privacy of
employees’ genetic information); Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy:
Rethinking Employee Protection for a Brave New Workplace, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1501
(2002).
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